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L IhNnODUCnoN
The problem of peace is an extremely topical and urgent matter
that now confronts mankind. In 1984, the United Nations adopted
the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace.' This Declara-
tion proclaims that the peoples of our planet have a sacred right to
peace and that preservation of peace is a fundamental obligation of
each state.2 Peace, which is the essence of man's life in society and
the substance of the relations between states, constitutes the highest
value of mankind provided that it is a genuine and just peace. To
date, the problem of a genuine and just peace has not been dealt
with scholarly as a separate subject in philosophical, legal, or
* Parker School of Foreign & Comparative Law, Columbia University. J.D. Jagiellonean
University, Cracow, 1952; L.L. M. University of Warsaw, 1953; Diploma in Political Science,
Centre Europeen Universitaire, Nancy 1957; L.L. D. Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan
1967; L.L. M. New York University, 1976; J.S.D. New York University, 1980. Former Human
Rights Officer in the Division of Human Rights at the Secretariat of the United Nations.
1. G.A. Res. 39/11, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 22, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985); G.A.
Res. 40/11, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986); G.A. Res. 41/10,
41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987).
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political writings in any country of the world. The goal of this study
is the analysis of a genuine and just peace in light of the views of
major political and legal thinkers as well as the attempt to determine
what is the essence of such a peace. This is the first systematic
study on this subject.
A. A Definition of Peace
A peace consists of internal tranquillity within a state, based
upon the recognition, guarantee, and strict observance of the basic
human rights of all individuals living in such a state, and normal
relations with other states based upon mutual recognition and
observance of the rights and legal interests of each other. Accord-
ingly, for a peace to be a genuine and just peace, it must satisfy the
following prerequisites: (1) the basic human rights, such as the
rights to life, living, freedom, education, equality, work, expression,
religion, and to leave and return to one's own country, must be
guaranteed to all individuals and be strictly observed by each state;
(2) any kind of internal or external oppression of individuals or
groups, be it political, economic, ideological, or religious, must be
strictly forbidden by each state; (3) all peoples and/or nations must
guarantee and strictly implement their right to self-determination,
including the right of secession; and (4) the occupation, subjugation,
or domination over other peoples, nations, or states by foreign
powers must be abolished.
All these prerequisites must be satisfied for a peace to be
genuine, just, and lasting. Without them, any peace imposed and
kept by naked force against the desires and wills of individuals,
peoples, nations, and states results in brutal oppression. Such a
peace is a source and cause of struggle by individuals and peoples
for their individual and collective human rights and the cause of war
by oppressed nations and states. Oppressed individuals, peoples,
and nations have the inalienable right to struggle for their individual
human rights and for their right to self-determination.
If the basic human rights, either individual or collective, are not
recognized and fully implemented by any country of the world or by
any group of such countries, the prerequisites for the existence of
a genuine, just, and lasting peace are not satisfied. Under these
circumstances, even if peace apparently exists, that peace, which is
the result of the oppressive behavior of one or more such countries,
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is illusory and temporary. The dissatisfied and oppressed individuals,
peoples, and/or nations sooner or later will struggle and fight for the
observance of their individual or collective human rights.
B. A Definition of Human Rights
Human Rights are all of the individual and collective human
rights which are recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and guaranteed by the International Covenants on Human
Rights.3 Human rights are those rights which are acquired by a
human being simply by the act of being born. Accordingly, human
rights are not favors or gifts which may be denied, suspended, or
withdrawn by the government or state at its capricious will.
Individuals are entitled to these rights and have a valid claim against
their governments or states for the failure to observe these rights
regardless of whether they are incorporated into the internal law of
a particular state.
Human rights may be generally divided into two groups:
individual human rights and collective human rights.4 The individual
human rights are those "which are recognized and guaranteed to
human beings in their individual character, and enjoyed by each
person individually."5 The collective human rights consist of those
rights "to which human beings are entitled collectively as members
of a greater community," such as a nation, a state, or even a
minority group within a state.6  Within the category of basic
collective human rights are the rights to peace and to self-deter-
mination.
C. The Basis of the Right to Peace
The philosophical and legal basis of the right to peace emanates
from the fundamental human right to life, from which all other
3. M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HuMAN RiGIrm? 87-130 (1973). The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A Res. 217 A, 3 U.N. GAOR at 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted
in A. BLAUSIEIN, R. CLARK & J. SIGLER, HUMAN RIors SOURCEBOOK 15 (1st ed. 1987);
see, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
4. Przetacznik, Individual Human Rights in John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, 25
NErH. INVL L. REV. 195-96 (1978).
5. Id. at 196.
6. Id.
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human rights stem.7 In this respect, Thomas Jefferson correctly
stated that "[t]he God who gave us life, gave us liberty [and other
rights] at the same time."' The enjoyment of the right to life is a
necessary condition to the enjoyment of all other human rights, for
one who is deprived of his/her right to life is thereby automatically
deprived of all other human rights.9 The right to life is an in-
defeasible and inalienable human right - an indefeasible right being
defined as that which is incapable of being annulled or made void,
Le., a right that one may not be deprived of without one's consent,
and an inalienable human right being defined as that which is
incapable of being surrendered or transferred, Le., a right one
cannot give away or dispose of, even if one wishes to.1" Thus, the
statement that the right to life as a fundamental human right is
inalienable means that, on the one hand, it cannot be surrendered
or transferred by the possessor, and, on the other hand, it cannot
legitimately be taken away by other person(s) or state(s) except in
the execution of a sentence of a court following conviction of a
crime for which this penalty is provided by the valid law.
Accordingly, from each human being's right to life derives the
duty of the state's institutions and authorities to respect the right to
life of such person. The duty of the state to respect the right to
life of individuals requires a prohibition against waging an aggressive
war against another state(s), because in such a war the right to life
of all persons who are killed is violated. In this respect, Thomas H.
Green noted that "whether we take the more positive or the more
abstract view of the right to free life this right is clearly violated in
war."" Killing in war always constitutes the violation of the right to
life of the individuals concerned, therefore, the waging of aggressive
war is forbidden to the state(s) based on its duty to respect the
right to life of individuals. 2
Thus, the basis of the right to peace emanates from the
fundamental human right to life. Accordingly, a genuine and just
7. Przetacznik, The Right to Life as a Basic Human Right, 56 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET PoLmouEs 27 (1978).
8. T. JEFFERSON, DEMOCRACY 237 (1939).
9. Przetacznik, supra note 4, at 197.
10. Id.
11. H. LEWIS, FREEDOM AND HISTORY 96 (1962).
12. Przetacznik, The Philosophical Concept of Peace as a Basic Collective Human Right, 26
REVUE DE DRorr PENAL MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GUERRE 362, 365 (1987).
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peace is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of the right to life and
other human rights. In this respect, Vsevolod Kuritsyn asserted that
"peace is essential if the rights and freedoms of the individual are
to be realised.""3 Therefore, individuals have the right to demand
that the state(s) observe their human rights and the state(s) has the
legal duty to do so. This is the basis of the right to peace as a basic
collective human right.
. THE RECOGNMON By THE THINKERS THAT PnAcE
Must BE GENUINE AND JusT
The history of international relations and the universal ex-
perience of mankind have demonstrated and convinced a great
number of political and legal thinkers, as well as statesmen, that
justice is the indispensable basis for a genuine and lasting peace
and that injustice leads to violence, bloodshed, and the general
destruction of normal relations among men, peoples, nations, and
states. As will be set forth below, many political and legal thinkers
who deal with peace assert explicitly or implicitly that peace is one
of the highest values of mankind. They also express in various
formulations the idea that peace must be genuine and just.
The political and legal thinkers whose works will be discussed
below used different formulations in their expressions of the idea of
a genuine and just peace. Among these formulations are: "genuine
peace," "real peace," "perfect peace," "ideal peace," "just peace,"
"righteous peace," "democratic peace," "genuine and just peace," "just
and durable peace." These terms explicitly mean that peace should
or must be "genuine" (real, perfect, or ideal, which generally signifies
genuine), or "just" (righteous or democratic, which generally signifies
just). The authors also utilize such expressions as "lasting peace,"
"enduring peace," "durable peace," "stable peace," "permanent peace,"
"universal peace," "eternal peace." These terms implicitly mean that
peace should or must be genuine and just if it is to be lasting and
permanent. The term "genuine and just peace" is the most fitting
term, for it best expresses the essence of this institution.
The authors of bilateral treaties, which impose the obligation to
live in peace upon the rulers and governments of the states
13. V. KURrISYN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE SoViET STATE 15
(1987).
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concerned, have also expressed the idea of a genuine and just peace
in various formulations. For example, there are included in treaties
such formulations as: "good, firm, and inviolable peace";" "a firm and
lasting peace";S "an universal and sincere peace"; "an universal and
perpetual peace";" "a good, firm, faithful, and inviolable peace"; 8 "a
good, firm, and durable peace";" "complete and perfect peace";' "a
universal, Christian Peace";21 "a Christian, universal and perpetual
peace."' These formulations mean either explicitly or implicitly that
peace should or must be genuine and just.
The political and legal thinkers who maintain that peace must
be genuine and just may be generally divided into three groups: (1)
those who assert generally that peace must be genuine and just; (2)
those who elaborate upon the idea of genuine and just peace; and
(3) those who express the idea of genuine and just peace in a
negative way.
A. The Thinkers Asserting Generally that Peace
Must be Genuine and Just
Hesiod was one of the first thinkers who expressed, in general
terms, the idea of a genuine and just peace. He asserted that peace
14. Treaty of Peace, Aug. 10, 1678, France-Holland, art. 1, in 1 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES
OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-1967, at 129 (F.L. Israel ed. 1967) [hereinafter MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES]; 14 THE CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 369 (C. Parry ed. 1969) [hereinafter
CONSOLIDATED TREATY],
15. Treaty of Peace, Sept. 17, 1678, France-Spain, art. I, in MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra
note 14, at 135; CONSOLIDATED TREATY, supra note 14, at 477.
16. Treaty of Peace, Feb. 3, 1678, Emperor-King of France, art. I, in MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES, supra note 14, at 139.
17. Treaty of Peace, Sept. 20, 1697, Great Britain-France, art. I, in MAJOR PEACE
TREATIES, supra note 14, at 145; CONSOLIDATED TREATY, supra note 14, at 445.
18. Treaty of Peace, Sept. 20, 1697, France-Netherlands, art. I, in MAJOR PEACE TREATIES,
supra note 14, at 153; CONSOLIDATED TREATY, supra note 14, at 351.
19. Treaty of Peace, Sept. 20, 1697, France-Spain, art. I, in MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra
note 14, at 162; CONSOLIDATED TREATIES, supra note 14, at 457.
20. Treaty of Peace, June 25, 1807, Emperor of France-Emperor of Russia, art. I, in
MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra note 14, at 470; CONSOLIDATED TREATIES, supra note 14, at
234.
21. Treaty of Peace, May 6, 1779, Holy Roman Emperor-King of France, art. I, in MAJOR
PEACE TREATIES, supra note 14, at 242.
22. General and Definitive Treaty of Peace, Oct. 18, 1748, Great Britain-France, art. I, in
MAJOR PEACE TREATIES, supra note 14, at 271; CONSOLIDATED TREATIES, supra note 14, at
305.
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must be just.' However, he did not elaborate upon the concept of
a just peace. Similarly, Confucius spoke of preserving peace by
upholding the laws of propriety and by recompensing evil with
justice. 4 Thus, in Confucius' system of philosophy, justice was a
basic prerequisite for peace. Isaiah and Pindar also expressed, in
general terms, the concept of a genuine and just peace. The former
said that the work of justice shall be peace.' The latter proclaimed
that "[k]indly Peace, Daughter of Righteousness, .... makest a
nation great."' Accordingly, Pindar asserted that any citizen "who
desired prosperity for his state must seek the radiant light of high-
minded Peace," 7 that is, a genuine and just peace.
Starting from the idea that in the long run justice would prevail
and right would indeed be victorious over might, Isocrates declared
that true prosperity is to be gained by peace founded on justice 8
Similarly, Clement of Alexandria indicated that peace must always
be based upon justice, because justice is the peace of life and
governs its stability and tranquillity." However, like the previous
thinkers, Isocrates and Clement did not define the notion of justice.
Saint Augustine also maintained that peace must be based on
justice.3" However, unlike the previous thinkers, Augustine did
define justice, describing it as the "virtue which accords to each and
every man what is his due."1 This general definition of justice does
not explain much.
In this respect, Francisco de Vitoria, who regarded justice as a
prerequisite for peace, went little further. He indicated that peace
and tranquillity exist within the state because courts are at hand in
which justice can be administered, wrongs redressed, and crimes
punished.2 Through this, Vitoria demonstrated how, in practice,
23. G. ZAMPAGLIONE, THE IDEA OF PEACE IN ANTIQUITY 27 (1973).
24. N. PARK, THE WHITE MAN'S PEACE 58 (1948).
25. Isaiah 9:7; A CONCISE TREASURY OF BIBLE QUOTATIONS 116 (R. Garvey ed. 1975);
PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE, SELECTIONS FROM PAPAL DOCUMENS, LEO XIII To Plus XII, at 112
(H. Koenig ed. 1943) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE].
26. W. CALDWELL, HELLENIC CONCEPTIONS OF PEACE 78 (1919).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 132.
29. G. ZAMPAGLIONE, supra note 23, at 251.
30. ST. AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD 454 (VJ. Bourke ed. 1958).
31. Id. at 469.
32. J. SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND
His LAw OF NATIONS 282 (1934).
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justice can affect peace. However, he spoke merely of one kind of
peace (within the state) and one aspect of justice (within the state).
This is justice in its strict legal and narrow sense.
Justice, in its strict legal meaning, constitutes only one element
of the term's broader, general meaning. For justice to actually
constitute the basic prerequisite for peace, it must: (1) exist, in its
narrow sense, as an administration of justice within every state; (2)
exist, in its broad sense, ie., justice as some kind of political, social,
and economic equity in the relations between individuals, peoples,
nations, and states; and (3) relate both to peace within the states
and to peace among the states. If all these conditions are satisfied,
justice constitutes the basic prerequisite for a genuine and just
peace.
Like Vitoria, Richard Pace generally argued that peace must be
"peace with justice,"33 but he did not explain what kind of justice he
meant or how justice could affect peace in order to make it
genuine. Blaise Pascal also considered justice to be a cornerstone
of a genuine peace. Though he went little further than Pace, Pascal
maintained that men have failed to establish universal principles of
justice, which alone can guarantee peace. 4 However, Pascal did not
precisely define these principles of universal justice and he did not
elaborate upon how their practical application could cause peace to
become genuine. He recognized the problem and raised it, but he
did not provide any specific suggestions for solving it. This is
understandable, because the problem of peace was not the basic
preoccupation of Pascal. He dealt with peace only marginally.
In modern times, the idea that justice is a basic prerequisite for
peace was strongly advocated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Pursuant
to his philosophy, the relations between peace and justice are in-
separable; without exception men, both powerful and weak, in their
relations and in the performance of their mutual duties, are obliged
to conform to the rules of justice and peace. a5 When Rousseau
spoke of justice, he did so in its broad sense. He expounded this
concept of social justice in his Social Contract, calling it "universal
33. J. RUSSELL, PEACEMAKING IN RENAISSANCE 56 (1986).
34. E. SOULEYMAN, THE VISION OF WORLD PEACE IN SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH-
CENTURY FRANCE 56 (1941).
35. Rousseau, Discourse Upon the Origin and the Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind,
in 34 THE HARVARD CLASSICS 216 (C. Eliot ed. 1910).
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justice," which "emanates from pure reason."'
William Penn also considered justice to be the foundation of
peace. He started from the premise that the perpetuation of peace
cannot be expected to survive unless it is based upon justice." Penn
expressed this idea in several formulations, such as "justice is a
preserver for it is a better procurer of peace than war,"' and "justice
is the means of peace." 9 Finally, he concluded that "peace is
maintained by justice."' However, like Pascal, Penn did not
precisely define justice. It appears that he meant justice in the
narrow sense. In addition, starting from the axiom that peace with
all the world is the true foundation of United States policy, John
Tyler affirmed that peace "can only be rendered permanent by the
practice of equal and impartial justice to all."41 Thus, impartial
justice is a prerequisite for a genuine peace.
Pope Leo XIII recognized that peace has its foundation in
justice when he said that "peace is the daughter of justice."42
Referring to Christian justice, Leo XIII maintained that a spirit of
peace "should lead nations to regard one another as brothers."4
Leo XIII understood Christian justice to consist of universal
brotherhood and the teachings of the Gospel." He believed that
such justice is a prerequisite for a genuine peace.4' Similarly, Pope
Pius X maintained that "when justice is taken away it is vain to
cherish the hope of peace. "' He further asserted that "peace
depends not only on statesmen but also upon the people who must
have a profound sense of justice."47
Starting from the premise that peace is a great good, Theodore
36. . RoussEAu, THE SocIAL CONTRACr 51 (1954).
37. . MARRIOTr, COMMONWEALTH OR ANARCHY? A SURVEy OF PROJECTS OF PEACE
FROM THE SIvEENTH To THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 77 (1937).
38. W. PENN, AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PEACE OF EUROPE BY THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EUROPEAN DYET, PARLIAMENT OR ESTATES 6 (1693)
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. F. BOECKEL, EFFORTS OF THE FOUNDERS OF THE UNrED STATES AND ITS LEADERS
To ABOLISH WAR 28 (3d ed. 1930).
42. PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE, supra note 25, at 85.
43. Id. at 94.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 93-94.
46. Id. at 112.
47. Id. at 123.
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Roosevelt asserted that one must remember that for peace to be
good it must be righteous, for "unrighteous and cowardly peace may
be worse than any war."' By this, Roosevelt meant that an
oppressive order imposed under the cloak of peace and maintained
by force is worse than war. Accordingly, peace must be genuine
and just. Hamilton Holt expressed a similar idea. He indicated
that "[p]eace is the outcome of justice, justice of law, [and] law of
political organization."49 Holt was referring to justice in its narrow
sense.
Justice as a basic prerequisite for peace was strongly advocated
by William E. Wilson, who asserted that the majority of every nation
loves peace, provided that such peace is compatible with justice."0
According to his argument, peace which is not based upon justice
cannot be lasting.5" Starting from this premise that justice helps to
keep the peace,52 William A. White declared that "peace without
justice is tyranny, no matter how you may sugar-coat it with
expediency. "" Neither Wilson nor White defined justice, but it is
clear from their statements that they spoke of justice in its broad
sense. Similarly, William H. Monroe affirmed that peace must be
founded upon the "spirit of justice."54 However, he did not elaborate
upon what he meant by this vague notion, "spirit of justice."
Felix J. Mlynarski advocated the same principle when he argued
that the condition of "peace must be the principle of justice."55
Mlynarski expressed a hope that "peace, calm and justice will reign
once more." Likewise, Pope John XXIII maintained that peace is
an "empty-sounding word" if it is not founded upon -justice." The
same idea was also expressed by Pope John Paul II, who asserted
48. W. HARBAUGH, THE WRITINGS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 28 (1967).
49. Holt, Foreword to W.H. TAFT, THE UNITED STATES AND PEACE, at vi (1914).
50. W. WILSON, THE FOUNDATION OF PEACE, A DISCUSSION OF PACIFISM AND THE
PREVENTION OF WARS 96 (1918).
51. Id. at 112.
52. White, The Importance of Free Speech, in PREFACE To PHILOSOPHY: BOOK OF
READINGS 290 (1967).
53. Id.
54. Monroe, War and Peace: The Military Point of View, in M. REELY, SELECTED ARTICLES
ON WORLD PEACE 131 (1914).
55. F. MLYNARSKI, THE PROBLEMS OF THE COMING PEACE 11 (1916).
56. Id. at 165. Lord Davies also called justice the foundation of peace. L. DAVIES, THE
SEVEN PILLARS OF PEACE 21 (1945).
57. POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS 57 (1963).
[VOL vi
that injustice is a great threat to peace,5" and by Oscar Arias
Sanchez, who urged that "justice and peace ian only thrive together,
never apart."59 This means that peace, to be a genuine peace, must
be based upon justice.
It follows from the above considerations that many thinkers,
both ancient and modern, Eastern and Western, recognized that
justice is the basic prerequisite for a genuine peace. Even though
they did not always use the exact expression "genuine peace," it is
indeed this type of peace to which they referred. It is clear from
the context in which these thinkers spoke of peace that in their
understanding a genuine peace must be based on justice. The
thinkers who asserted that peace must be based upon justice, usually
did not define it and did not specify what kind of justice they meant.
However, it is clear from the context in which they use justice that
they mean both justice in its strict sense and justice in its broad
sense.
B. The Thinkers Elaborating on the Idea of Genuine
and Just Peace
Thucydides was one of the first thinkers who elaborated upon
the idea of a genuine and just peace. His concept of such a peace
was expressed in the speech of the Spartan plenipotentiaries who
had been sent to Athens to offer peace during the Peloponnesian
war. In his view, a genuine and just peace: (a) cannot be
motivated by hatred and revenge; (b) cannot be imposed by force;
and (c) must be negotiated with moderation."' Needless to say, such
peace must also be based upon justice. Thus, Thucydides' concept
of a genuine peace is rational.
Starting from the premise that peace is our final good, Saint
Augustine maintained that anyone "who is rational enough to prefer
right to wrong ... can see that the kind of peace that is based on
injustice, as compared with that which is based on justice, does not
deserve the name of peace."'62 He explained that the task of justice
58. 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (17th mtg.) at 353, U.N. Doc. Ai34/PV. 17 (1979).
59. Clines, 'Leave Us in Peace,' Costa Rica Pleads, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1987, at A3, col.
2.
60. HOBBESs THUCYDIDES 253 (R. Schlatter ed. 1975).
61. Id. at 254-55.
62. ST. AUGUSTINE, supra note 30, at 454.
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is to see that each person is given what belongs to him/her.'
Augustine's view, that a peace based on injustice is not a peace, has
been proven true over time. History clearly demonstrates that
injustice in the relations among men, peoples, nations, and states is
the paramount obstacle to the existence of normal relations among
them and constitutes a very serious threat to internal and interna-
tional peace.
Likewise, William Penn, having in mind the idea that the
demand for peace is a demand for justice, equal rights, and universal
liberty, maintained that the observance of these rights is essential
for peace." It is clear from this statement that a genuine and just
peace is that which guarantees justice, freedom, and equal rights to
individuals, peoples, and nations. A similar idea was expressed by
Pope Leo XIII, who asserted that "peace cannot possibly be
established if it does not rest on the foundation of Christian public
law, from which comes the concord of [rulers] among themselves
and of peoples with their [rulers]."'
Similarly, Pope Benedict XV expressed his hope that "just and
lasting peace" should put an end to the horrors of the First World
War." He fervently exhorted all nations to establish among
themselves a true peace, which would be based upon the "laws of
justice" and therefore be just and lasting. 7 Pope Pius XI also
considered that a genuine peace must be based on justice, because:
"Justitia et pax osculatae sunt - . . . charity must not be separated
from justice."' Both Popes believed that a genuine peace should
guarantee equality and freedom, including freedom of religion, to
individuals, peoples, and nations, but they especially stressed the
point that justice should be a basic prerequisite of peace.
Woodrow Wilson correctly insisted that "[n]o peace can last, or
ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that
governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about
63. Id. at 469.
64. W. PENN, supra note 38, at 7-8.
65. PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE, supra note 25, at 93-94.
66. Id. at 221.
67. Id. at 291.
68. Id. at 322.
[Vol VI
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."' He
maintained that any "peace which does not recognize and accept this
principle will inevitably be upset,"" because such peace "will not rest
upon the affections or convictions of mankind."71 Wilson explained
that the spirit of whole populations will subtly and constantly be
against peace imposed and maintained by force, and all the world
will sympathize with these populations.' In his view, "[t]he world
can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability
where the will is in rebellion, where there is no tranquility of spirit
and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right."'
The concept of a genuine and just peace was also advocated by
Yoshiro Sakatani, who maintained that such a peace must be
founded on universal ideas of justice, humanity, liberty, indepen-
dence, and equality. He stressed that these ideas have expanded
and become international, that such universal ideas as justice,
humanity, liberty, independence, and equality belong to both the rich
and poor, the strong and weak, of every country of the world.74 It
is evident from Sakatani's statements that the prerequisites for a
genuine and just peace are the recognition and observance of basic
human rights.
Bolton C. Waller dealt extensively with the concept of a genuine
and just peace. In his view, permanent peace is attainable, but such
a peace must be based upon freedom, justice, and human progress,
which will make the good life possible for individuals.' He
recognized that order and stability are of paramount importance for
peace, but he asserted that freedom and progress were even more
important components to the state's well being.7' Waller demonstra-
ted the fundamental fact that permanent world-peace is unattainable
69. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the United States Senate, Peace Without Victory
(Jan. 22, 1917), in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 126 (H. Commager ed. 7th ed.
1963).
70. W. WILSON, WHY WE ARE AT WAR 11 (1919).
71. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PAMPHLET No. 31, OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROPOSALS, DECEMBER
1916 To NOVEMBER 1918, at 52-53 (J. Scott comp. 1921).
72. Id. at 53.
73. Id.
74. Sakatani, International Mind - The Basis for the Conclusion of Peace, 6 THE JAPAN
PEACE MOVEMENT 1 (1918).
75. B. WALLER, PATHS To WORLD-PEACE 13-14, 74 (1926).
76. Id. at 74.
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unless the two essential principles of order and freedom are kept
constantly adjusted.'
Waller explained that peace can be permanent only by constant
adjustments and readjustments, by dealing with each new problem
or difficulty whenever it arises, by wise constructive statesmanship
applied, not once, but repeatedly, by resolute determined efforts
which must continue so long as man lives upon earth.' Accordingly,
the international community must ensure peace and order, freedom
and justice, and provide the means for bringing about those changes
which the desires of men from time to time will make imperative.'
Similarly, Nicholas M. Butler asserted that durable peace is to
be based upon human liberty, justice, and honorable conduct.'
Without "this, there is no peace, but only a rule of force until
liberty and justice revolt against it in search of peace."81  Butler
noted that "peace cannot be invoked to protect a denial of human
liberty, or injustice, or dishonorable and minatory conduct on the
part of any state."8 These statements concerning a genuine and just
peace are clear and do not require additional explanations.
In his proposals for peace of August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV
pointed out that the Church acts in order to bring a just peace
"which would be stable and honorable for all."' Benedict XV
explained the essence of his just and lasting peace. First, "the moral
force of right must be substituted for the material force of arms."'
Second, the states must agree upon and guarantee the "simultaneous
and reciprocal diminution of armaments."' Third, "as a substitute
for armies," a court of compulsory arbitration should be established
with authority to impose appropriate sanctions against any state
which refuses either to submit an international dispute to it or to
accept its decision.' Fourth, territorial and political questions must
77. Id. at 77.
78. Id. at 79.
79. Id. at 78.
80. N. BUTLER, THE PATH To PEACE 9 (1930).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. PRINCIPLES FOR PEACE, supra note 25, at 229.
84. Id. at 230.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 230, 233.
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be examined and settled in the spirit of equity and justice.' When
the delegates of several nations were united "in solemn congress for
the purpose of giving to the world a just and lasting peace,"' the
Pope insisted that "peace deliberations" should be conducted in good
faith, so that "a peace, just and honorable for all, might ensue."'
Pope Pius XII was a strong advocate of a genuine and just
peace. He asserted that "a fundamental postulate of any just and
honorable peace is an assurance for all nations, great or small,
powerful or weak, of their right to life and independence."' The
maintenance of "true peace, requires that the nations be delivered
from the slavery imposed upon them by the race for armaments."91
Pius XII enumerated five conditions necessary for the establishment,
maintenance, and preservation of a genuine and just peace. First,
there must be victory over the hatred which divides the nations, and
the elimination of systems, conduct and behaviors by certain states
which breed such hatred.' Second, there must be victory over
distrust, which exerts a paralyzing pressure on international law and
makes all honest understanding impossible." The foundation of
justice is the loyalty, reliability, and truth of the pledged word and
of the understanding which has been reached. Third, there must be
victory over the dismal principle that utility is the basis and objective
of law and that might can create right.' Such a principle upsets
normal international relations and is not acceptable for weaker
states. Fourth, there must be victory over those potential conflicts
which arise out of disequilibrium in the world economy.' It is
necessary to establish a new economic order affording all states the
possibility to secure for their citizens an appropriate standard of life.
Fifth, there must be victory over the egoism of strong powers which
impairs the honor and sovereignty of other nations and the freedom
of individuals.'
87. Id. at 231.
88. Id. at 260.
89. Id. at 258.
90. Id. at 636.
91. Id. at 637.
92. CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ETHics 190-91 (J. Eppstein ed. 1953).
93. Id. at 191.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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The idea of a genuine and just peace was also expounded upon
by Wei Tao-Ming, who considered that harmony and equity "are the
true foundation and indispensable factors of peace."' In his concept
of a genuine and just peace: (a) nations large and small must stand
as equals in the family of nations; (b) there must be no thought of
superior or inferior nations, or peoples, or individuals; and (c) all
nations, peoples and individuals must be allowed to work out,
without external interference, their own destiny, and independently
make their proper contribution to the common achievement of
scientific, cultural, and spiritual values." Accordingly, in such a
peace, the individuals, peoples, nations, and states should work not
only for their own gains and interests, but also for the common
good of all mankind.
Starting from the premise that peace is a precious commodity,
Harry S. Truman asserted that even "more precious than peace are
freedom and justice."" In his view, a genuine and just peace must
be based upon freedom and justice, which are the values that give
meaning to human lives.1" He asserted that a just and lasting peace
must be built upon good will and good deeds as well as upon
power."' Truman insisted that a genuine and just peace "be not
[only] peace in our time, but peace for all time,""° and that we must
be willing to pay the price of such peace. 3
From the premise that a genuine and just peace is not a reward
that comes automatically to those who cherish it, Truman asserted
that such a peace "must be pursued, unceasingly and unwaveringly,
by every means at our command.""° He also correctly stated that a
genuine and just peace "is safest in the hands of the people and we
can best achieve the goal by doing all we can to place it there.""
Finally, Truman pointed out that the benefits of peace "come to
those who have sown the seeds of peace."1" Truman's concept of
97. Tao-Ming, Victory is not Enough, 5 FREE WORLD 15 (1943).
98. Id.
99. THE QUOTABLE HARRY S. TRUMAN 121 (T. Settel ed, 1967).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 120.
102. Id. at 121.
103. Id. at 122.
104. Id. at 120.
105. Id. at 121.
106. Id. at 122.
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a genuine and just peace is rational and clear.
The idea that peace must be just and genuine was also strongly
advocated by Dag Hammarskjold. In his view, "the question of
peace and the question of human rights are closely related."' 7
Indeed, as Hammarskjold expressly stated, "[w]ithout recognition of
human rights we shall never have a peace, and it is only within the
framework of peace that human rights can be fully developed."'"
From this statement it is clear Hammarskjold believed that without
the recognition and strict observance of human rights by every
member-state of the United Nations, the existence of a genuine,
just, and lasting peace was impossible. Hence, according to him,
peace is inseparable from the recognition and observance of human
rights.
John F. Kennedy expounded upon the concept of a genuine
and just peace. According to him, "peace is a process, a way of
solving problems.""°  Recognizing that world peace is the most
important topic on earth, Kennedy first demonstrated what forms of
peace would be unacceptable."' He asserted that world peace
should not be either "a Pax Americana enforced on the world by
American weapons of war" or "the peace of the grave or the
security of slaves.""'
Regarding the form of peace which was acceptable and
desirable, Kennedy expressed the belief that it should be a kind of
peace: (1) that "makes life on earth worth living"; (2) that "enables
men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for
their children"; (3) that exists for "all men and women"; and (4) that
is not merely for "our time," but for "all time.""' He noted that "a
genuine peace must be the product of many nations and the sum of
many acts.""' 3 Such peace "must be dynamic, not static, changing to
meet the challenges of each new generation.""4
Lech Walesa has asserted that a genuine peace must be based
107. THE QuEsr FOR PEACE 315 (A. Cordier & W. Foote eds. 1965).
108. Id.
109. J.F. KENNEDY, THE BURDEN AND THE GLORY 55 (1964)
110. Id. at 53.
111. Id. When Kennedy asserted that world peace should not be a Pax Americana, it is
implicit that it should also not be a Pax Sovietica.
112. Id. at 53-54.
113. Id. at 55.
114. Id.
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on justice and the observance of human rights of individuals. In his
view, respect for "human rights in Poland and for our national
identity is in the best interests of all Europe"115 because "the Polish
aspirations to freedom will never be stifled." 16 Walesa was absolute-
ly right when he stated that dialogue between the people and the
Communist rulers in Poland is the only way to achieve internal
peace, and that this dialogue is also an indispensable element of
peace in Europe."7
Similarly, Ronald Reagan acknowledged that "just as we all
know what peace is,... we certainly know what peace is not.""' He
maintained that it is necessary that a "[tirue peace rest on the pillars
of individual freedom, human rights, national self-determination, and
respect for the rule of law."'19  He indicated that a peace "is ecure
only when individuals are free to direct their own governments."'
From their statements, it is clear that both Reagan and Walesa
consider the recognition and strict observance of human rights to be
basic prerequisites for a genuine and just peace.
Hector G. Espiell expounded a very interesting concept of a
genuine and just peace. He asserted that peace necessarily identifies
itself with the idea of justice.' Having in mind that peace and law
are unavoidably united concepts and that peace and justice are
related notions, Espiell correctly demonstrated that human rights
cannot exist without peace, and peace cannot exist without respect
for human rights.'" He explained that this maxim applies to the
internal situations of the states and to international situations as
well."'
It follows from the above considerations that the thinkers who
elaborate upon the idea of a genuine and just peace assert that such
a peace: (a) must be established by understanding and be founded
on universal ideas of justice, freedom, and equality of individuals and
115. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1983, at A10, col. 3.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1985, at All, col. 3.
119. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
120. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1985, at All, col. 3.
121. Espiell, El Derecho a la Paz, 3 REv. DEL INST. INTERAMERICANO DERECHOS HUMANOS
87 (1986).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 88.
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peoples, irrespective of sex, color, social status, political position,
political or social philosophy, or religion; (b) must guarantee to all
states, strong and weak, independence and equality; (c) must
guarantee the recognition and strict observance of individual and
collective human rights by every country of the world; and (d) must
guarantee the recognition and strict implementation of the right to
self-determination of peoples and nations by every country which
politically dominates such peoples or nations.
C. The Thinkers Expressing the Idea of Genuine and
Just Peace in a Negative Way
Expressing the idea of a genuine and just peace in a negative
way entails describing how such a peace should not be or negating
such peace. One of the first thinkers to express the idea of a
genuine and just peace in a negative way was Euripides. Beginning
with the idea that every man realizes how much better peace is for
mankind than war," Euripides "made it clear that he was never for
peace at any price."'" A similar position was taken by Isocrates. He
rejected the "King's Peace," which was imposed upon Greece and
severely limited her independence."2 Isocrates thus rejected peace
imposed by force in the form of slavery, domination, and oppression,
and in this way he said that peace must be genuine and just.
A similar idea was expressed by Cicero, who urged that one
should always work for peace,27 but the price for peace cannot be
slavery."z This statement demonstrates that Cicero, like Euripides,
was against the idea of peace at any price. Peace in the form of
slavery and oppression was also denounced by Galgacus. Referring
to the so-called Roman concept of peace, which was nothing less
than slavery, domination, and oppression, he stated that from "the
yet more terrible Romans ... escape is vainly sought by obedience
124. W. CALDWELL, supra note 26, at 105.
125. Id. at 104.
126. GREEK ORATIONS 33 (W. Connor ed. 1966); A. SAUNDERS, GREEK POLITICAL ORATORY
121-22 (1970).
127. M. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 21 (C. Edmonds trans. 1858).
128. Zouche, An Exposition Of Fecial Law And Procedure, or of Law Between Nations, and
Questions Concerning The Same, in 2 THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (J. Scott ed.
1911).
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and submission."' With a genuine and just peace in mind, Tacitus
indicated that Agricola, by "the repression of these abuses in his
very first year of office, restored to peace its good name.""3  Thus,
he demonstrated that abuses of power are incompatible with a
genuine and just peace.
Similarly, Edwin H. Chapin affirmed that there are interests that
are too dear to be sacrificed for peace.' Accordingly, he too was
against the idea of peace at any price. Charles M. Talleyrand
considered that nothing matters except peace, and that the sole
function of statesmanship was to assure the existence of peace.
However, he rejected the concept of peace imposed by force. In
referring to Napoleon, Talleyrand stated that even on St. Helena he
had not yet learned his lesson, "for he [Napoleon] wrote that what
he had intended was 'order and peace for Europe,' but it was to be
a peace and an order imposed by force, by military conquest, and by
cultural colonization - a new pax Romana, in other words, forced
upon Europe."13
Talleyrand argued that peace must not be "peace at any price -
but peace with honor."'' a  He did not explain what he understood
to be peace at any price or peace with honor; however, there are
reasons to believe that when he spoke of this peace, he meant a
genuine and just peace. The general conclusion to be drawn from
the above considerations is that, according to Talleyrand, peace must
be genuine and just and that an order imposed by force is not such
a peace, but its negation.
Theodore Roosevelt asserted that in the closing decade of the
nineteenth century the great European powers, by joint action, had
maintained the infamous peace. He exclaimed that during that
period, "[wiar was avoided; peace was kept; but what a peace!.""3'
Peace, which serves merely as a mask and an instrument for
despotism and oppression "becomes a very evil thing."35 Roosevelt
129. TACIUS, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF TACTUS, THE ANNALS, THE HISTORY, THE LIFE
OF CNAEUS JULIUS AGRICOLA, GERMANY AND ITS TRIBES, A DIALOGUE ON ORATORY 695
(1942).
130. Id. at 689.
131. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 455 (T. Edwards ed. 1974).
132. J. BERNARD, TALLEYRAND: A BIOGRAPHY 264 (1974).
133. Id. at 570.
134. W. HARBAUGH, supra note 48, at 28.
135. Id. at 371.
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pointed out that many tyrants have cried peace when they have
"scourged honest protest into silence."1" From Roosevelt's state-
ments it is clear that an oppressive order, imposed forcefully and
kept by force for the purpose of domination over and exploitation
of other peoples, nations, and countries, is the negation of a
genuine and just peace.
William Jennings Bryan also indicated how a genuine and just
peace should not be. He stated that "[t]he age-long attempt of
powerful nations, sometimes acting alone and sometimes in groups,
to terrorize the world into peace has failed and failed miserably."'37
Although Bryan was not specific in his statement, it is obvious that
he referred to the Holy Alliance's concept of peace, which was an
oppressive order imposed by force and kept by force. He was
accurate when he stated that "[t]he theory of peace by terrorism has
exploded with bursting shells."'" Here, he meant the outbreak of
the First World War.
Bryan demonstrated that an oppressive order imposed and kept
by naked force is not peace, but its negation. Randolph S. Bourne
affirmed that "[n]o peace is possible unless the idea of world
domination is given up."'39  In accord with this position is Oscar
Newfang, who referred to the period of history dominated by "four
autocracies [the Czar of Russia, the Kaiser of Germany, the
Emperor of Austria-Hungary, and the Sultan of Turkey] constantly
scheming to dominate the world, or large portions of it, by the force
of arms" as a period during which it was not possible to form "a
peaceful and friendly union of nations of the world for the purpose
of maintaining international peace on the basis of justice."1" He
correctly stated that "[i]nternational justice was the last thing that
these autocrats wanted to see established."'41 They sought, "not just
relations with their neighbors, but domination over them."'42 Since
they could not achieve such domination by peaceful methods, they
136. Id. at 372.
137. W.H. TAFr & WJ. BRYAN, WORLD PEACE: A WRTTEN DEBATE BETWEEN WILLIAM
HOWARD TAFr AND WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN 29 (1970).
138. Id. at 66.
139. R. BOURNE, TowARDs AN ENDURING PEACE, SYMPOSIUM OF PEACE PROPOSALS AND
PROGRAMS 1914-1916, at 113 (1916).
140. 0. NEWFANG, THE ROAD To WORLD PEACE 133 (1924).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 133-34.
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resorted to war so they might impose it by force.'43  In these
statements, Newfang expressed the idea that peace imposed and
kept by force is not a genuine peace, and that justice is the basic
prerequisite for a genuine and lasting peace. This leads to a
conclusion that, without justice, such a peace is impossible. Finally,
Newfang implied that authoritarian regimes are unable to establish
and maintain a genuine peace based on justice.
James M. Beck denounced and rejected unjust peace. He
maintained that "the preservation of a peace based upon fear cannot
be either durable or just, for such a peace would generally mean
the acquiescence of weaker powers in the demands, often unjust, of
stronger powers."'" Beck argued that injustice is infinitely worse
than war; thus, not every peace is preferable to war for "there can
be peace with dishonour; and multiplied death is better than
multiplied disgrace."'45 Finally, Beck explained that "it is infinitely
better to have justice through war than injustice through peace,
which deliberately sacrifices justice.""4 Now it is impossible to obtain
justice through war, because war is illegal.'47
Political and legal thinkers, in principle, reject the concept of
peace at any price, because such a peace is usually nothing more
than an oppressive order dictated or imposed by force by the
stronger state(s) upon the weaker state(s). In addressing this
"1peace-at-any price" concept, David S. Jordan stated "let us see your
price-lists first. Let us find out what we want, and count the cost."'"
He referred to the peace that Europe enjoyed in June, 1914, just
before the beginning of the First World War as "the peace of
'proper armament,'" and he proclaimed that such a peace "is not for
us. It costs too much - a waste of human effort and human life that
civilization cannot long endure."'49
In these statements, Jordan showed that armed peace is not a
genuine peace, and that such a peace is too expensive and cannot
last long. The logical conclusion then is that such a peace is not
143. Id. at 134.
144. J. BECK, THE WAR AND HUMANITY 34-35 (1917).
145. Id. at 35.
146. Id. at 36.
147. See Przetacznik, The Illegality of War, 64 REVUE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL DE
SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLMQUES 101, 141 (1986).
148. Jordan, The Guarantee of Peace, THE PEACE FORUM, July 1914, at 11.
149. Id.
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acceptable, for, as Hiram M. Chittenden pointed out, "[tihe whole
subject of armed peace ... rests on an irrational basis."5' Ernst
Richard also rejected the concept of armed peace. He stated that
"the Pax Romana is not an ideal for modern friends of peace." 51 In
his view, this peace is "worthless";'52 it is "the Roman conception of
pacification, namely, to compel a nation, by the supremacy of
military strength, to tolerate injustice."1" Accordingly, Arthur C.
Watkins stated that a "coerced or dictated 'peace' is not peace at
all."154
Fraudulent and deceitful proposals of peace were suggested by
Adolf Hitler in his speech before the Reichstag on October 6, 1939.
Referring to the German-Russian Pact of "friendship and mutual
interest"'55 which "clearly defined the boundaries of their own
spheres of interest,""6 and to the annihilation of the Polish State,'57
Hitler said "I believe even today that there can only be real peace
in Europe and throughout the world if Germany and England come
to an understanding."'58 He asked "[w]hy should this war in the
West be fought? For restoration of Poland? Poland of the
Versailles Treaty will never rise again. This is guaranteed by two of
the largest states in the world [Nazi Germany and the Communist
Soviet Union]."'59
Edouard Daladier, the French Prime Minister, referred to the
deceitful proposals of peace made by Hitler in this speech as talk
"of peace, of German peace, of peace which would only consecrate
conquests by deceit or violence [of Austria, Czechoslovakia and
Poland] and would not prevent preparation for new [conquests]."1 °0
150. H. CHITTENDEN, WAR OR PEACE 131 (1911).
151. E. RICHARD, GOD'S PATHS To PEACE 14 (1914).
152. Id. at 15.
153. Id.
154. A. WATKINS, THE PARIS PACT 41 (1934).
155. 354 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION,
DOCUMENTS FOR THE YEAR 1939, at 508 (1939) [hereinafter 354 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIA-
TION]. The pact referred to is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. Przetacznik,
The Soviet Type of Peaceful Coexistence is not a Prerequisite for Peace, 65 REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLMQUES 225, 229 (1987).
156. 354 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, supra note 155, at 509.
157. Id. at 498.
158. Id. at 515.
159. Id. at 519.
160. Id. at 526.
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Daladier stated that Hitler's speech before the Reichstag actually
amounted to: "I (Hitler) destroyed Poland, I am satisfied; let's stop
the combat; let's hold a conference to consecrate my conquests and
organize peace."161 Daladier was absolutely right that a genuine and
just peace cannot be based upon illegal conquests and enslavement
of peoples and nations, and upon their oppression and exploitation.
He also correctly pointed out that "[i]f peace is really desired,
a lasting peace, it will be necessary to understand that security of
nations can rest only on reciprocal guarantees excluding any surprise
and erecting a barrier against any attempt at domination."'62
Daladier further declared that "[i]f peace is really desired, a lasting
peace, it will be necessary to understand finally that the time has
passed when territorial conquests bring well-being to the con-
querors.""6  The general conclusion to be drawn from Daladier's
statements is that a genuine and just peace cannot be based upon
the conquest, domination, and oppression of other peoples and
nations.
Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, was a vigorous
advocate of peace, and at the 1938 Munich Conference he paid a
very high price, the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia, for the preservation
of "[t]he peace of Europe."'" However, even this high price did not
preserve peace. Conscious of Hitler's fraudulent concept of peace,
Chamberlain rejected the peace proposals put forward by the
German Chancellor in his speech on October 6, 1939, proposals
which were strongly supported by the Soviets.'" Chamberlain
maintained that on September 1, 1939, Hitler violated Polish
frontiers and invaded Poland. 66 He stated that in contravention of
law, "Polish towns and villages were bombed and shelled into ruins
and civilians were slaughtered wholesale."'67 Chamberlain asserted
that "it is after this wanton act of aggression, which has cost so
many Polish and German lives sacrificed to satisfy his own insistence
on the use of force, that the German Chancellor now puts forward
161. Id.
162. Id. at 527.
163. Id.
164. N. CHAMBERLAIN, IN SEARCH OF PEACE 270 (1939).
165. 354 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, supra note 155, at 531.
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WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, World War II, at 387 (1970).
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his proposals."1" Chamberlain indicated that Hitler's deceitful peace
proposals "are to be based on recognition of his conquests and his
right to do what he pleases with the conquered."" The British
Prime Minister further pointed out that "all the peoples of Europe,
including the peoples of Germany, long for peace,""' but this peace
must be genuine and just, a "peace which will enable them to live
their lives without fear and to devote their energies and their gifts
to the development of their culture, the pursuit of their ideals, and
the improvement of their material prosperity.""' Finally, Chamber-
lain asserted that the "peace which we are determined to secure
however, must be a real and settled peace, not an uneasy truce
interrupted by constant alarms and repeated threats.""
Another figure who referred to the oppressive and aggressive
Nazi regime was Anthony Eden, who declared that "[w]e are
determined upon the destruction of Hitler, his regime, and all it
stands for. For we know that until this is achieved, no foundation
will exist upon which lasting [genuine and just] peace can be built."73
Eden stated that "[w]e have learnt that ... the price of [a genuine
and just] peace is constant vigilance, readiness, courage; and we
must never forget that lesson.""4  In his Message to Congress of
January 6, 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt similarly insisted that
principles of morality and considerations for our own security will
never permit us to acquiesce in peace dictated by aggressors and
sponsored by appeasers, declaring that "enduring peace cannot be
bought at the cost of other people's freedom."75
Also against a peace attained by appeasement was Ann S.
Cardwell, who stated that a "peace attained by appeasement, if it be
attained, is an unjust peace."76 Cardwell was correct, for such a
peace is usually the result of a dictate imposed by the aggressive
power(s), through the use of illegal threats and blackmail, upon the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 532.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Anthony Eden, Address at the Foreign Press Association Luncheon (July 29, 1941),
in 1 BRITISH OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, PEACE AIMS 23.
174. Id. at 24.
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weaker state(s) or upon even the strong state(s) which wants to
keep peace at any price. Usually the price for peace attained by
appeasement is paid mainly by the weaker state which is sacrificed
by the state(s) which wants to preserve the semblance of illusory
peace, even when it is against its own vital interests. The foremost
example of such dictated illusory peace is the Munich Agreement of
September 30, 1938, concluded between Hitler, Mussolini, Chamber-
lain and Daladier.177
Phillip M. Brown indicated that many timid souls, who dread
violence in any form, approach peace in a cowardly manner, viewing
it as desirable at any price, even at the cost of justice and honor. 78
In other words, these persons are ready to sacrifice everything for
a quiet life. Brown correctly affirmed that there can be no
tranquillity where there is injustice, 179 because injustice creates
disorder. Pursuant to his view, peace and order can exist if men act
justly, that is, if they apply, in their relationships and in their
conduct, the principles of justice. Finally, Brown correctly stated
that peace cannot be imposed by legislation, political or social
system, command or force,"8 because appropriate conditions must
exist for there to be a genuine and just peace.
Similarly, referring to the totalitarian concept of peace, which is
nothing more than an order imposed by force and trickeries, Dwight
D. Eisenhower indicated that "peace may be marked by, or may
even be the product of, chicanery, treachery, and the temporary
triumph of expediency over all spiritual values."'81 He stated that
"[w]ithout these values [such as freedom, and the recognition and
observance of human rights] peace is an inhuman existence."'8
Assuming a genuine and just peace, Eisenhower declared that
peoples want to live in peace - not an imposed peace, as sought by
Hitler and now sought by the Communist powers, which is a mere
stilling of the guns, but a peace lodged "in freedom, where all
[peoples] dwell in security.""8
Eisenhower pointed out that peace must be secure and just, but
177. Wright, The Munich Settlement and International Law, 33 AM. J. INTL L. 12 (1939).
178. P. BROWN, THE SCIENCE OF PEACE 22 (1942).
179. Id. at 23.
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181. D. EISENHOWER, PEACE WITH JUSTICE 2 (1961).
182. Id. at 3.
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not "bought at the expense of others, not bought at the expense of
principle, and not bought by the abject surrender of our vital
interests [Le., freedom, justice, and other basic human rights]."1
Accordingly, Eisenhower considered that a genuine and just peace
should guarantee the rights of individuals, peoples, nations, and
states.18
Pointing to a grave misconception of the nature of peace by
many persons who erroneously have identified peace as a perpetua-
tion of the oppressive status quo,'8 John F. Dulles indicated that
such people claimed that "peace" meant keeping this oppressive
status quo forever.'87 Plainly the oppressive status quo cannot be
maintained, because it constitutes the violation of basic individual
and collective human rights.
Dulles correctly indicated that peace must take into account "the
fact that life is essentially dynamic, that change is inevitable, and
that transformations are bound to occur violently unless there are
provided ways of peaceful change."", Dulles was right when he
stated that any world system is doomed if it identifies peace with a
mere maintenance of the status quo, because to do this is to breed
the forces of revolution and revolt." The history of mankind
demonstrates that in such situations, the oppressed individuals,
peoples, and nations always struggle for the recognition and
observance of their individual and collective human rights.
Referring to the peace that prevails in a state dominated by one
party, one group of self-perpetuating rulers, the peace of the
policeman and the jail, Lester B. Pearson stated that, while peace
was desired, this was not the correct kind of peace; what was
desired was a genuine peace, characterized by the absence of fear
and the presence of friendship and cooperation."l In his view, a
genuine peace must be based upon people understanding one
another, for there can be no such peace if people do not know one
184. Id. at 83.
185. Id. at 129.
186. 369 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION
493 (1941) [hereinafter 369 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION].
187. J. DULLES, WAR OR PEACE 18 (1950).
188. 369 INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, supra note 186, at 493.
189. Id.
190. L. PEARSON, THE FOUR FACES OF PEACE AND THE INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK 167
(1964).
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another. He correctly stated that there can be no cooperative
coexistence among peoples and nations if men are cut off from one
another.191 Pearson asserted that if we get peace without the
recognition of human dignity and freedom we will have failed, and
for this reason we must always refuse to admit that the only
alternative to peace is surrender, out of fear, to unjust demands."1
According to Urpo Harva, not every kind of peace is an
absolute good,93 because "a peaceful community may be so ridden
with injustice, oppression, and deprivation of liberty that the
situation may well be considered worse than war."" Here, Harva
expressed the correct idea, but through an erroneous formulation.
He should have stated that "a peace may be so ridden with injustice,
etc.," rather than "a peaceful community," which does not make
sense in this context.
The expression "peace" and the term "peaceful community" have
qualitatively different meanings. The former is a legal and political
existence, the latter is a factual group or an association of people.
It must be observed that the notion of a peaceful community, which
is ridden with injustice, oppression, and the deprivation of freedom,
is a contradiction in itself. That is because such a community is not
peaceful at all and could not be peaceful as such. However, an
imposed peace may be ridden with injustice, oppression, and
deprivation of freedom. Such an oppressive order is the negation
of a genuine peace.
Carlos Santamaria properly stated that "[p]eace can never be
imposed by arms."' He explained that constraint, dictation, and
domination by force "have no right to the name of concord [peace],
even if they eventually overcome the adversary's resistance and
create a kind of unanimity which is completely artificial."'"
Santamaria pointed out that peace gained by such methods is "the
same as the peace of guns and graveyards, in which the will of the
adversary is never won by reason and generosity."'97 In this respect,
Maurice Edelman correctly articulated that "stability achieved by a
191. Id. at 17.
192. Id. at 72-73.
193. Harva, War and Human Nature, in THE CRmOUE OF WAR 51 (R. Ginsberg ed. 1969).
194. Id. at 52.
195. Santamaria, In Search of a Concept of Peace, in 2 WORLD JUSTICE 19 (1960-61).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 20.
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dictated peace is the first cousin to war."'" In his statements
concerning peace, Santamaria, in a negative way, demonstrated that
peace must be genuine and just.
Henry Kissinger, like Eisenhower, confirmed that "the United
States will never seek stability [peace] at the expense of others."1
A genuine and just peace, Kissinger properly asserted, "cannot be
maintained unless all share in its benefits."' If all do not share the
benefits of peace, such peace is not genuine and just. Therefore,
Kissinger pointed out, the United States "strives for the peace of co-
operation, not the illusory tranquillity of condominium,""' because
peace "is ennobled by making possible the realization of humane
aspirations."' In other words, the United States is striving not for
the establishment of an imposed order by force, but for a genuine
and just peace, which will make possible the realization of human
rights.
As discussed previously, Ronald Reagan not only suggested the
kind of peace which should be, but also the kind of peace that
should not be. 3 Thus, he asserted that a "peace based on repres-
sion cannot be true peace."' Moreover, Reagan affirmed that
"[pleace based on mutual fear cannot be true peace because staking
our future on a precarious balance of terror is not good enough.
The world needs a balance of safety."2  Finally, Reagan declared
that "a peace based on averting our eyes from trouble cannot be
true peace."' It follows from the above considerations that,
according to Reagan, peace based on domination, fear, and
repression enforced by brutal force is not a genuine peace and will
not last.
In a negative way Manuel Obando y Bravo brilliantly expounded
upon the idea of a genuine and just peace. He claimed that "[p]eace
is just an empty word if it is not directed at society's well-being."" 7
198. Edelman, Russia: War or Peace, 1 WORLD AFFAIRS 4 (1947).
199. 6 U.N. GAOR Special Mtg (2214th mtg.) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2214 (1974).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
204. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1985, at All, col. 3.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Obando y Bravo, Peace in Nicaragua, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1983, at A17, col. 5.
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Indicating that today everyone talks about peace, he suggested that
false forms of peace are very much in vogue.' Referring to the
activities of totalitarian regimes, Obando y Bravo stated that it "is
common to impose peace, to 'pacify' a country with a formidable
army, with executions, [and] persecution."' He correctly asserted
that "peace can never be imposed by anyone.""21 Instead he urged
that "[p]eace should create joy, not fear; it should provoke fellow-
ship, not hate."211
In Obando y Bravo's view, peace is also often confused with a
certain order some regimes claim to maintain.212 This is the "typical
peace in countries ruled by a minority trying to pass off its own
interests as those of the nation's."'213 He pointed out that it is
similar to imposed peace, but "in a sense more deadly, because it is
under the guise of law and order."14 With this type of peace, "the
meaning of life completely disappears."215 Thus, Obando y Bravo
contended that "[w]e become useful dummies, guinea pigs, caged
birds, living very contentedly."" He maintained that peace cannot
be imposed, bought or sold, but must be sought and molded; we
must make sacrifices for peace. 7
From these statements it follows that, according to Obando y
Bravo, a genuine and just peace cannot be confused with an order
imposed by force and kept by force, because the latter is the
negation of the former. Living in his native country, Nicaragua, he
learned from experience that the totalitarian type of peace is not
peace at all but order imposed and kept by naked force and
oppression. Such oppressive order is a serious threat to peace,
because the individuals whose human rights are systematically
violated always struggle for the recognition and strict implementation
of those rights.
Beginning with the idea that peace is the aim and normal
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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condition of the existence of the international community, Krzysztof
Skubiszewski postulated that peace is based on the independence of
one nation from another, therefore, categories such as peace
founded on the hegemony of one state over another or by the
forcible creation of a multinational empire (e.g. Pax Romana) have
no place in contemporary international law.218 Like many previous
thinkers, Skubiszewski questioned whether a genuine and just peace
can be identified with order imposed by force, because usually such
an order is oppressive and negates peace, which should be based
upon the independence of nations.
A similar idea was expressed by Oscar Arias Sanchez, who stated
that peace "is not the product of a victory or command." '19 Remarki-
ng on the peace in Central America, Arias Sanchez insisted that he
sought "not peace alone, not peace to be followed someday by
political progress, but peace and democracy, together, indivisible, an
end to the shedding of human blood, which is inseparable from an
end to the suppression of human rights."' Thus, for a peace to be
genuine and just, it must guarantee the observation of human rights.
These thinkers, who expressed the concept of a genuine and just
peace in a negative way, suggest how such a peace should not be.
Accordingly, a genuine and just peace should not be: (a) an
identification with an order imposed by force and kept by force; (b)
an oppression imposed by force and kept by force; (c) a peace
achieved by a conquest and enslavement of other peoples, nations,
and states; (d) an identification with an oppressive status quo and
perpetuation of it forever; and (e) a countenance and perpetuation
of slavery or foreign domination in any form. In their view, a
genuine and just peace can only be achieved through understanding.
III. CONCLUSIONS
It follows from the forgoing considerations that the substance of
a genuine and just peace contains the following elements:
1. Peace, which is the essence of man's life in society and of the
relations between states, constitutes the highest value of mankind,
218. Skubiszewski, Peace and War, in 4 ENCY. OF PUB. INTL L. 75 (R. Bernhardt ed. 1982).
219. Clines, supra note 59, at A3, col. 1.
220. Id.
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provided that it is a genuine and just peace. Peace is not simply the
absence of disorder or violence. Therefore, peace must not be
confused with an oppressive order imposed by force, where human
rights are systematically violated, and such order is maintained by
naked force.
2. Peace, which is not based upon justice and does not guaran-
tee the recognition and the strict implementation of the individual
and collective human rights by every state of the world, is not a
genuine peace. Such illusory peace, wherein the basic individual and
collective human rights of individuals, peoples, and/or nations are
constantly violated, is an oppressive order, which constitutes a
negation of a genuine peace.
3. An oppressive order cannot be confused with peace, and
especially with a genuine and just peace, because they are institu-
tions which are diametrically different and mutually exclusive. Thus,
an illusory peace, which serves merely as a mask and an instrument
for oppression and exploitation of individuals, peoples, and/or
nations, becomes a very evil thing. Accordingly, this manifestation-
does not deserve the name of peace.
4. Peace cannot be bought and preserved at any price,
especially if it results in the deprivation of personal freedom of
individuals or would be shameful to their dignity as persons. Since
peace cannot be disassociated from justice, freedom of individuals,
and their dignity as human beings, the price for peace cannot be
oppression, slavery, and foreign domination and exploitation. Such
violations of human rights are incompatible with a genuine and just
peace.
5. A genuine and just peace can never be imposed by force
upon the vanquished or weaker opponents by the stronger powers.
Such peace must be based upon justice and the recognition of
individual and collective human rights of individuals and peoples
concerned, and of the legitimate rights and legal interests of the
nations and states concerned. Justice is the basic prerequisite for
a genuine and just peace; without justice, peace cannot exist at all.
6. In the context of a genuine peace, justice is not the asserted
claim of any one party, but it must be determined by the judgment
of the International Court of Justice or other competent internation-
al tribunal. In order to implement a genuine and just peace, every
country must accept all human rights recognized and consecrated by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by the International
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Covenants on Human Rights.
7. The ratification of or accession to the International Cove-
nants on Human Rights by all states of the international community
and the strict implementation of all their provisions by all these
states is the basic prerequisite for a genuine and just peace. The
situation wherein individual and collective human rights are not
recognized and fully implemented does not deserve the name of
peace. The systematic violation of human rights by any country
constitutes a threat to peace and creates a danger of war.
8. International concern for individual and collective human
rights is inextricably connected with a genuine and just peace,
because the enslavement and oppression of individuals and peoples
usually extends beyond the borders of the state. History demon-
strates how easily internal oppression leads to external aggression.
Besides being an essential condition of any peace, safeguarding
human rights remains an end in itself, as an integral element of a
genuine and just peace.
9. From Jeremiah's day until the moment the United Nations
recognized and consecrated individual and collective human rights,
men insisted and repeated, again and again, that there was peace
when there actually was not and could not have been a genuine and
just peace, because the human rights of individuals, peoples, and/or
nations had not been internationally recognized and protected.
Without such recognition and protection of human rights, a genuine
and just peace is absolutely impossible.
10. The history of mankind demonstrates that any international
order, either imposed unilaterally by force by way of conquests, Le.,
the so-called Pax Romana, or the Soviet type of peace, or imposed
by way of an international agreement between the victorious powers,
such as the so-called Holy Alliance, was not actually peace, that is,
not a genuine and just peace. Such an oppressive order imposed on
individuals, peoples, and nations actually represented the negation
of peace.
11. The progress of civilization and international recognition of
individual and collective human rights has reached a level from
which it cannot and will not retreat. Accordingly, mankind will not
purchase peace at any price, and is not prepared to tolerate the
suppression of freedoms for individuals and peoples or of the
national independence of nations and states in order to maintain an
illusory peace.
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12. At present, men and women demand a genuine and just
peace in which dignity and all human rights in all countries of the
world are strictly implemented by governments and individual
freedom are observed by those governments. The relations between
the individuals and their rulers must be based upon valid laws, to
which the former freely consent.
13. A genuine and just peace cannot be a static condition of
life achieved by the renunciation of war, nor a mere pious desire to
live in peace. Peace must be a dynamic and continuous process for
the achievement of freedom, justice, progress, and full implementa-
tion of all individual and collective human rights by every country of
the world. Peace requires strict international supervision of the
implementation of all human rights by every state of the interna-
tional community.
14. One of the prerequisites of a genuine and just peace is the
firm establishment in peoples' minds and habits of toleration of
different creeds and philosophical, political, social and economic
views, as well as mutual understanding of the legitimate rights and
legal interests of individuals, peoples, nations, and states. Moreover,
the international community has the duty to grant assistance to
peoples who are striving for the recognition and observance of all
their individual and collective human rights.
15. The essential prerequisite for a genuine and just peace is
appropriate education designed to instruct children, students, and
the public at large on individual and collective human rights and
on the necessity of every country in the world implementing these
rights. Moreover, such education for peace must be designed to
promote friendly cooperation between nations and a sense of the
essential oneness of all mankind, as well to demonstrate that war
in which all weapons of massive destruction are deployed could be
the end of civilization.
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